US diplomat: Has dropped America from its foreign policy priorities

Smith says the end of the war and the current relative calm in Afghanistan have called into question some of the wartime arguments. Many of the concerns raised in 2021—from the spread of jihadism and instability in Central Asia to mass migration of Afghan citizens to Europe—did not materialize to that extent. Nevertheless, the Taliban’s ties to al-Qaeda remain troubling; though Miller believes al-Qaeda was severely weakened before the U.S. withdrawal and its revival would not necessarily benefit the Taliban.


The Taliban are also in conflict with ISIS-Khorasan, and reports have emerged of limited cooperation between them and the U.S. in counterterrorism efforts, though the details are unclear.


According to these two analysts, the Taliban’s governance, alongside severe social controls, faces serious economic challenges. Miller views Afghanistan, in terms of the restrictions imposed on women and girls, as one of the world’s most repressive regimes and warns that depriving women of education and work will lead in the future to a shortage of female doctors and specialists.


Smith also says that after the Taliban’s return, about 20 to 30 percent of the country’s economy collapsed, and although the economy has seen slight improvement, the annual entry of around 500,000 to 600,000 people into the job market, the return of migrants, and the persistence of poverty and hunger have intensified the pressures. He also recalls the Taliban’s initial revenge attacks against those linked to the former government, followed by a reduction in that trend and the recruitment of some former government employees into current Taliban administrations.


Miller sees one of America’s fundamental mistakes as the decision to topple the Taliban in 2001 and then accept responsibility for building a new government. She believes Washington could have kept its focus on al-Qaeda and, in years of greater leverage, pushed for a more serious political settlement.


In her view, U.S. policy toward Pakistan was also based on unrealistic expectations of changing Islamabad’s strategic interests, and widespread corruption in the former government further eroded its legitimacy. Miller considers the Doha Agreement largely favorable to the Taliban and says Washington coordinated the withdrawal more with the Taliban and failed to prepare the former government for collapse; Smith also notes that the speed of the government’s fall surprised even some Taliban negotiators.


These two analysts believe that on Afghanistan’s future, there are differences between Taliban officials and the religious circle close to Hibatullah Akhundzada; but fear of schism has prevented these differences from turning into open confrontation. Miller deems U.S. recognition of the Taliban unlikely; but limited cooperation on shared interests possible. From her perspective, the most probable scenario is the continuation of the current situation; that is, the Taliban remain in power; but Afghanistan stays poor and vulnerable. A change in leadership could pave the way for transformation, but there is no guarantee that the next leader would pursue a different, more moderate policy.



Lorel Miller, a former American diplomat, and Graeme Smith, a former analyst at the International Crisis Group, stated in the "Afghanistan After America" podcast in Foreign Affairs magazine that Afghanistan quickly fell off Washington’s foreign policy priority list after the withdrawal of U.S. forces. In their view, this neglect has made it difficult to assess America’s decisions and mistakes during two decades of military presence in Afghanistan. Miller says Washington spent years pouring vast financial and human resources into supporting the former government, building security forces, and combating terrorism; but now questions are being raised about the necessity and scale of those costs.

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